This paper develops and simulates a model of a Bayesian market maker who transacts with noise and position traders in derivative markets. The impact of noise trading is examined relative to price determination in FX futures, noise transmission from futures to options, and risk-management behaviour linking the two markets. The model simulations show noise trading in futures results in wider bid-ask spreads, increased price volatility, and greater variation in hedging costs. Above all, the Bayesian market maker manages price-risk by trend chasing not for speculative purposes, but to avoid being caught on the wrong side of the market. The pecuniary effects from this risk-management strategy suggest that noise trading tends to constrain the market maker's capacity to arbitrage; particularly when the underlying price is mean averting as opposed to a Martingale and trading sessions exhibit significant price volatility.
Under rational expectations the values for v and 1Àv given in (8) are internally consistent with the 'fair value' option prices (5) and (7) . This is seen by considering the process by which rational traders form expectations over the fundamental value of the underlying asset, p 0 . Note that the expected returns from taking a long position in the futures contract are given by
No-arbitrage conditions imply zero expected returns from increased buying or selling of futures, or in other words, the expected futures price is equivalent to its fundamental value at the beginning of the period. Thus, FX derivative traders who form 'rational expectations' consistent with this 'no-arbitrage property' will take the price at the beginning of the period as an unbiased predictor of the expected futures price at the end of the period, Eðp f Þ¼p 0 . 6 Otherwise, traders would overvalue or undervalue futures, and thus perceive option values different from the 'fair values' given by (5) and (7) . To set the stage for later work, assume that position traders have unbiased beliefs denoted by the random parameter v o , while noise traders have biased beliefs denoted by v N . Thus, under bullish conditions noise traders believe that the underlying asset is undervalued with probability v N 4v o ¼ 0:5, and under bearish conditions they believe that it is overvalued with probability 1 À v N 41 À v o 40:5. Accordingly, these biased sentiments form non-Bayesian expectations among noise traders, i.e. agents who trade on noise rather than information (Black, 1986) . 7 Table 1 gives the effect of bullish and bearish market sentiments relative to price expectations and option values. The no-arbitrage future price is defined by P o ¼ 1:20, consistent with unbiased sentiments (v 5 1Àv 5 0.5). Deviations from the no-arbitrage price reflect biased valuations: bullish traders who overvalue futures will buy more calls and sell more puts; bearish traders who undervalue futures will sell more calls and buy more puts. These transactions create apparent arbitrage opportunities for a contrarion trader, such as a market maker.
BAYESIAN MARKET MAKING
Initially, the sentiments implied by the parameters v N and v o reflect private information to noise and position traders. Assume that a Bayesian market maker assigns binomial probability distributions to these valuation parameters. Thus, at the market open, let P M ðv N Þ and P M ðv o Þ denote the market maker's prior beliefs over the valuation parameters v N and v o , 8 where P M ðv N ÞþP M ðv o Þ¼1. Assume that the market maker continually revises his/her priors on the basis of incoming market orders, n ¼ 1; 2; 3; ..., of which j represent buy orders and nÀj represent sell orders. 9 Given this information ðFÞ, the market maker's posterior probabilities are denoted by P M ðv N jFÞ and P M ðv o jFÞ, expressing revised beliefs conditional upon buy-sell order flows. These posterior probabilities are obtained applying Bayes' rule:
where the conditional probability terms PðFjv N Þ and PðFjv o Þ denote the likelihood of biased and unbiased asset valuations (v N and v o ) given incoming order flow information, i.e.
Note how the valuation parameters v N and v o are weighted by the j buy orders and nÀj sell orders. Consequently, the terms v j N ð1 À v N Þ nÀj and v j o ð1 À v o Þ nÀj reflect the weighted sentiments of noise and position traders, and the expression n!=j!ðn À jÞ! reflects the number of possible combinations of j buy orders out of n orders received. Table 2 describes the market maker's Bayesian learning process over 5 intraday time steps under bullish and bearish conditions. For illustrative purposes the number of buy and sell orders at each time step is represented by a random integer value of 1 or 0 orders, assuming valuation parameters v 0 ¼ 0:5 for position traders and v N ¼ 0:65 for noise traders.
Panel (a) describes bullish sentiments among noise traders. These conditions increase the chance that buy orders will outnumber sell orders. Thus, in time step 1 the market maker receives j 5 1 buy orders and nÀj 5 0 sell orders. This information increases the likelihood of a bull market from 0.5 to 0.65, and moves the market maker's posterior probability of bullish valuation from 0.5 to 0.57. Additional order flow information arrives in time step 2 via j 5 1 buy orders and nÀj 5 1 sell orders. The arrival of new information dampens the likelihood of a bull market from 0.65 to 0.46, thus decreasing the market maker's posterior probability of bullish valuation from 0.57 to 0.54.
Panel (b) describes bearish noise-trader sentiments with sell orders outnumbering buy orders. In time step 1 the market maker receives nÀj 5 1 sell orders and j 5 0 buy orders. This information increases the likelihood of a bear market from 0.5 to 0.65, thus increasing the market maker's posterior probability of bearish valuation from 0.5 to 0.57. Additional market orders arrive in time step 2 via j 5 1 buy orders and nÀj 5 0 sell orders. This new information dampens the likelihood of a bear market from 0.65 to 0.35, thus decreasing the market maker's posterior probability of bearish valuation from 0.57 to 0.48.
From the standpoint of market making, this Bayesian learning has implications in how noise trading affects market-making behaviour; specifically, the determination of bid and ask prices, and their adjustment 
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F S
in maintaining inventory control. To describe this behaviour, we assume that bid and ask prices (P b and P a ) are quoted at each intraday time step relative to a market-clearing price for the underlying asset (P o ), the market maker's perception of market sentiments ða N Þ and ða N Þ À1 , and the extant inventory position (I), i.e.
where T denotes the minimum tick size; the terms ða N Þ and ða N Þ À1 denote the odds of bullish and bearish sentiments, i.e.
ða N Þ¼ P m ðv N jFÞ 1 À P m ðv N jFÞ and ða N Þ À1 ¼ 1 À P m ðv N jFÞ P m ðv N jFÞ and the terms f a ðIÞ and f b ðIÞ describe inventory control behaviour, where f 0 a ðIÞo0; f 0 b ðIÞo0a n d f a ð0Þ¼f b ð0Þ¼0. 10 Table 3 gives the effect of noise-driven order flow on market-making behaviour over 5 intraday time steps. Panel (a) assumes bullish sentiments and thus an increased chance that buy orders will exceed sell orders (j4nÀj) at each time step. This tendency appears over time steps 3-5 as shown by an increasing odds ratio a N and higher bid-ask prices. Panel (b) assumes bearish sentiments with net selling pressure over all 5 intraday time steps. These market perceptions increase a À1 N and lower the bid-ask prices. These price adjustments reflect the operation of both an information and inventory control channel in determining market-making behaviour by the optimizing agent. 11 
HEDGING 'NOISE-TRADER RISK'
Suppose that noise traders dominate position traders in the underlying asset market (FX futures). Depending on the degree of noise trading, the market maker may be unable to correct order flow imbalances through intraday adjustments in bid and ask price quotes. Consequently, noise-driven order flow may result in inefficient liquidity supply, as reflected by undesired inventory positions. Here we consider how the resulting noise-induced inventory price-risk can be delta-hedged (Silber, 1990) . Table 4 summarizes the qualitative relationship between noise-driven order flow in futures and the market-maker's inventory and hedging positions. Bearish sentiments tend to lower the futures price, provoking an increased number of sell orders for calls and buy orders for puts. The market maker therefore ends trading with a long position in calls and a short position in puts. This inventory position carries the risk that the futures price will continue falling overnight. Conversely, bullish futures trading leaves the market maker short in calls and long in puts; the risk here is that the underlying price will be bid-up even further overnight. In either case, the inventory price-risk is due to the mean-averting tendency of the noisedriven futures price. Delta-hedging can be used to neutralize the risk posed by noise-driven price movements in the underlying asset. For example, suppose intraday trading reduces the futures price by 4%, resulting in a 2% change in both call and put prices. Thus, at the market close the delta-hedge ratios are 0.5 for calls (À0.02/ À0.04) and À0.5 for puts (0.02/À0.04). If the inventory position in puts and calls is balanced then no hedging is required, i.e. the options portfolio is delta-neutral. Otherwise delta-hedging is required to neutralize inventory price-risk, either by selling or buying the underlying asset.
We examine delta-hedging using Black's model for pricing European-style options on FX futures. The pricing formulas for European call and put options on FX futures are given by c ¼½FNðd 1 ÞÀXNðd 2 Þe ÀrðTÀtÞ and p ¼½XNðd 2 ÞÀFNðÀd 1 Þe ÀrðTÀtÞ ð13Þ with parameters
The corresponding hedge ratios for call and put options on FX futures are given by D c ¼ Nðd 1 Þe ÀrðTÀtÞ and D p ¼½Nðd 1 ÞÀ1e ÀrðTÀtÞ ð15Þ
where N(1) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a normally distributed variable with mean zero and standard deviation 1.
SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In order to simulate pricing and hedging behaviour we assume that a trading day covers 20 time steps over which the market maker revises his/her probability beliefs based on the arrival of buy and sell orders. Order flow and bid-ask pricing are determined simultaneously each time step conditional on extant noise-trader sentiments, i.e. the V n parameter. Intraday trading is simulated n 5 5000 times for each specific V nparameter value. In total we obtain 1.5 million simulation trials, reflecting varying degrees of noise-trader sentiments ranging from V n 5 0.35 (bearish) to V n 5 0.65 (bullish), with step increments of size 0.001. The results from these simulations shed light on the impact of noise trading on liquidity and pricing in the underlying market, and the prices and delta-hedge ratios for puts and calls on the underlying asset. Figures 1(a) -(d) illustrate price and inventory in the underlying market based on descriptive statistics drawn from the entire sample of simulation trials. Figure 1(a) plots the mean values of the closing price relative to noise-trader sentiments. With neutral sentiments the closing price remains near its initial value (1.000), and otherwise becomes mean averting as noise traders lean in one direction or the other. This tendency reappears in Figures 1(b) and (c), which plot mean values of the bid-ask spread and price volatility (measured by the %-change between open-close prices). The spreads increase as noise-trader sentiments grow stronger, adjusting to information arrival and inventory imbalances. Figure 1(d) shows Noise Inventory Figure 1 . Noise-trading effects in futures market. Ã Noise-trader sentiments vary from 0.350 (bearish) to 0.650 (bullish), with 0.500 representing neutral. Five thousand simulations were made at each value, using step sizes of 0.001. Thus, each figure reflects the output from 1.5 million simulations, i.e. 5000 Â (0.65À0.35)/0.001. Figure 1(a) shows the impact of noise on mean values of the futures price (measured by the midpoint of the bid-ask spread at the end of trading); Figure 1(b) shows the effect of noise on the mean bid-ask spread; Figure 1(c) shows the impact of noise on price-volatility (measured by the percentage change between open and closing prices);
and Figure 1(d) shows the impact of noise on inventory in the underlying asset (measured at the end of the trading session). inventory positions at the end of trading. Under neutral conditions the market maker ends trading with minimal inventory. Otherwise, noise trading results in inventory imbalances at the end of trading. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for a sub-sample of the simulations represented in Figures 1(a)-(d) . Under neutral sentiments (V n 5 0.5; n 5 5000 trials) the mean closing price (0.9917) and the pre-trade price (1.0000) are virtually the same. In addition, the mean value of the bid-ask spread is consistent with a 1-tick market (1EÀ04), wherein the market maker maintains efficient inventory turnover and market liquidity. Not surprisingly, the mean value of inventory at the end of trading is practically zero (0.0854). On the contrary, noisy sentiments (V n 5 0.35, 0.65; n 5 4380, 4881 trials) correlate with increased price volatility (0.0357 or 0.0772), wider bid-ask spreads (0.0009 or 0.0019), and non-zero inventory positions at the end of trading (10.42 or À11.22) . Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for option prices and delta-hedge ratios for the same sub-sample of simulation trials described in Table 5 . The mean values of the noise-driven option prices and delta ratios vary from the neutral-sentiment values according to the direction of the noise and the degree of price volatility in the underlying market. In addition, the standard deviations corresponding to these variates increase under noisy conditions in the underlying market. This noise-dependency is observed more generally in Figures 2(a)-(d) over the entire sample of simulation trials.
Market sentiments also impact the cost of hedging inventory positions in the derivatives market. For example, neutral sentiments are more likely to result in balanced inventory positions at the end of trading (putsEcalls), and thus minimal exposure to inventory price-risk if these positions are maintained overnight. Accordingly, the cost of hedging options inventory will depend on the degree of noise trading in the underlying market and the market maker's overnight inventory constraint. Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for delta-neutral hedging subject to an overnight position constraint of $1 mm. Under neutral sentiments the market maker opens and closes trading with a balanced position in puts and calls (four puts and four calls). No hedging is required in this case because the inventory position is delta-neutral. Under bearish sentiments the market maker ends trading with a long position in calls and short position in puts. In this case delta-hedging overnight inventory requires selling futures with a mean cost of À$991 613 and a standard deviation of $55 943. Under bullish sentiments the market maker ends trading short in calls and long in puts. In this case delta-hedging overnight inventory requires buying futures with a mean cost of $902 313 and a standard deviation of $64 350. For simplicity the simulation trials assume that the market maker rebalances his hedged position at the end of the trading day subject to an overnight inventory constraint. Here one sees that noise trading has a notable impact on the variation in hedging costs. Moreover, the impact on hedging cost increases if the hedged position is rebalanced less frequently under a less restrictive position constraint.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
'Noise-trader risk' impacts the pricing and risk-management behaviour of a Bayesian market maker. We model and simulate this behaviour assuming that order flow from noise and position traders gives a noisy signal of market sentiments. Our theoretical framework identifies the price discovery process following either a Martingale or a mean-averting process, depending on the degree of noise trading. Moreover, the model predicts that noise transmission from futures to options will have pecuniary effects on delta-hedging behaviour. To this end 'noise-trader risk' may keep market makers from taking arbitrage positions.
Under noisy market conditions a Bayesian market maker privately benefits from a risk-management strategy, which coincides with trend chasing; that is, selling futures as their price gets hammered, or buying them as it inflates-not for speculative purposes, but to avert the risk of being caught on the wrong side of the market. This hedging behaviour tends to push the FX futures price further away from the fair value, and is motivated by the argument that supplying liquidity in a noise-driven derivatives market engenders significant inventory price-risk. In such an environment one is reminded that 'it may pay more for smart money to follow dumb money rather than to lean against it'-a perspective argued some time ago by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and Russell and Thaler (1985) . 
